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siveness criterion distinguishes isolated beliefs on issues of ultimate
concern from systems of beliefs governing all aspects of the adherent's
life.6 3 The final criterion, the institutional nature of the beliefs, may require unwieldy and potentially unconstitutional classifications of religious ritual similar to those necessitated by the Ideal Life multifactual
analysis. 64 Despite the shortcoming inherent in the final criterion, the
first two factors of Judge Adams' analysis remove questions of church tax
exemptions as far as practicably possible from the innately subjective nature and constitutional scrutiny of establishment and free exercise
questions.
While the result in Ideal Life was the right one, the multifactual analysis used by the Minnesota Supreme Court is constitutionally suspect. A
religious organization should not have its status as a church determined
from a standard derived from the formal characteristics of any given religion. An analysis looking to the organization's genuine purposes and the
comprehensiyeness of the organization's efforts to achieve its purposes
provides a less objectionable method of allowing church property tax
6
exemptions. 5

Criminal LaW-INHERENT JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO EXPUNGE
NAL RECORDS-State v. CA., 304 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1981).

CRIMI-

Expungement is the process of eradicating the legal record of arrest or
conviction., The need for this important process is indicated by the fact
two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one
narrow to forbid "an establishment" and another, much broader, for securing
"the free exercise thereof." "Thereof" brings down "religion" with its entire and
exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the second guaranty, so
that Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as
they are regarding the other.
330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Adams stated, "It is difficult
to justify a reading of the first amendment so as to support a dual definition of religion
..Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 592 F.2d at 211-12.
63. 592 F.2d at 209.
64. An inquiry into the institutional nature of a religious organization may result in a
subjective evaluation of the tenets of a "church." Such an inquiry would create the same
problems the Ideal Life multifactual analysis presents and therefore should never be
controlling.
65. A simple but, at least for now, politically unfeasible alternative to all methods of
analysis is the outright abolition of church property tax exemptions.
1. See Grandison v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 423 F. Supp. 112, 116
(D. Md. 1976); Police Comm'r v. Municipal Court, 374 Mass. 640, 648, 374 N.E.2d 272,
277 (1978); State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1975); see also Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records ofJuvenile and Adult Offenders.- A Problem of Status, 1966
WASH. U.L.Q. 147. Professor Gough states:
By an expungement statute is meant a legislative provision for the eradication of
a record of conviction or adjudication upon fulfillment of prescribed conditions,
usually the successful discharge of the offender from probation and the passage
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that of the 10.4 million arrests 2 in the United States in 1980, only sixtyone percent will result in convictions.3 All arrestees, however, will have a
criminal record unless the record of their arrest is expunged.4 The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. CA. 5 addressed the scope of expungement relief available in Minnesota. 6 The effect of CA. is to expand
slightly the inherent power of Minnesota courts to grant expungement of
of a period of time without further offense. It is not simply a lifting of disabilities
attendant upon conviction and a restoration of civil rights, though this is a significant part of its effect. It is rather a redefinition of status, a process of erasing
the legal event of conviction or adjudication, and thereby restoring to the regenerate offender his status quo ante.
Id. at 149 (citation omitted).
2. Uniform Crime Reports Program procedures require that an arrest be counted on
each separate occasion an individual is taken into custody, notified, or cited. Only one
arrest is counted for each individual arrested, regardless of the number of charges lodged
against him. Traffic violations are excluded. The number of arrests increased 29% between 1979 and 1980. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 189, 191 (1980).
3. The 39% not convicted includes individuals who were arrested but subsequently
exonerated because they were acquitted of the charge or the case was dismissed. See Comment, Cnminal Procedure." Expunging the Arrest Record when There Is No Conviction, 28 OKLA. L.
REV. 377, 378 n.4 (1975).
4. As of 1974, only six states had statutes authorizing the expungement of an exonerated arrestee's record. Comment, The Expungement or Restriction of Arrest Records, 23 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 123, 127 n.24 (1974). These statutes, however, never apply to the FBI's Identification Division. Nearly all arrests made in the United States are forwarded to the FBI
and stored in computers for ready use by law enforcement agencies across the country.
For a discussion of FBI policy regarding dissemination of arrest records, see Note, Menard
v. Mitchell: Expungement vs. Retention of Arrest Records, 41 UMKC L. REV. 106, 108-10
(1972), and Case Comment, Criminal Law-Constitutional Lawv--FB. s Right to Retain and
Disseminate Arrest Records of Persons Not Convicted of a Crime May Be Limited by the First and Fifth
Amendments, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 825 (1971).
5. 304 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 1981). The plaintiff's name is refered to by initials to
protect anonymity. Id. at 355 n.l.
6. Id. at 357. Four general types of expungement exist. See generally Annot., 46
A.L.R.3d 90 (1972). The most widely adopted is the destruction of local records and the
recall of copies forwarded elsewhere. See, e.g., United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968
(D.P.R. 1967) (physical destruction of arrest record); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334,
487 P.2d 211 (1971) (return of arrest records to arrestee); Note, The Rights of the Innocent
Arrestee. Sealing of Records Under California Penal Code Section 851.8, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1463,
1469 (1977). A second type is amendment of the record to show the arrestee's innocence.
See, e.g., Beasley v. Glenn, 110 Ariz. 438, 520 P.2d 310 (1974) (statute permits notation to
be entered if arrestee cleared after wrongful arrest); District of Columbia v. Sophia, 306
A.2d 652 (D.C. 1973) (remedy for mistaken arrest is clarification of record by notation
showing innocence). A third option is sealing the record and thereafter allowing examination only upon issuance of a court order. See, e.g., People v. Robertson, 97 Misc. 2d 1026,
412 N.Y.S.2d 982 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979) (sealing of record and return of arrest record);
People v. Casella, 90 Misc. 2d 442, 395 N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1977) (defendant not
within statute and sealing of record denied); Note, supra, at 1469. Although many jurisdictions distinguish between sealing and expungement because sealing does not involve
destruction, for purposes of this case note the terms will be treated as synonymous. The
fourth type is prohibiting dissemination of the record. See, e.g., People v. A., 99 Misc. 2d
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The petitioner in CA. was convicted of consensual sodomy. Pursuant
to the conviction he was temporarily committed to the State Security
Hospital at St. Peter and then to the state correctional facility at Stillwater.8 The Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial. The charges against the petitioner were subsequently
dropped and the case was never retried. 9 Petitioner sought expungement
of his criminal record pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 299C. 11
and prior case law. 0 The trial court granted part of C.A.'s motion and
295, 415 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978) (defendant's arrest and prosecution records
sealed and dissemination prohibited).
The controversy over when and how to use expungement arises from the natural
conflict between general societal good and individual rights. See Case Comment, Criminal
Procedure: Expungement of Arrest Records, 62 MINN. L. REV. 229, 230-31 (1978). See generally
Nizer, The Right of Privacy. A Half Centugy's Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941);
Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Prwacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?
Or- Pivacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1974). The belief that
arrest and conviction records must be available to aid police in criminal activity conflicts
with the threat to individual arrestees' privacy arising from the retention and dissemination of arrest record information, especially when the arrestee is subsequently acquitted or
deemed mistakenly arrested. See Case Comment, supra, at 231; Comment, Expungement and
Sealing of Arrest and Conviction Records: The New Jersey Response, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 864,
865-66 (1974). Even if an individual is proven entirely innocent the record remains. Anyone subsequently gaining access to it for employment, security, political or criminal investigations may indirectly continue the prosecution. Such exposure could be annoying,
prejudicial or damaging to the arrestee. See 304 N.W.2d at 362; see also United States v.
Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75, 78-79 (E.D. Pa. 1973). For additional judicial discussions of the
disabilities that flow from an arrest record, see Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Wilson v. Webster, 467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1972);
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417

F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citing

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE

EFFECTS OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON UNEMPLOYMENT

IN THE DISTRICT OF CO-

(1967)). The Report cited in Morrow found that most prospective employers used
arrest records and that the consequencs of a person having been arrested, even if the
charges were subsequently dismissed, were severe. But see Kogon & Loughery, Sealing and
Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCi.
378 (1970). Kogan and Loughery criticize expungement of records both in principle and
in fact. They argue that, in principle, expungement is nothing more than a state sanctioned lie and, in fact, it does not work because records always leave some trace that makes
the expunged information retrievable. See id at 383.
7. Several expungement statutes exist in Minnesota. MINN. STAT. § 638.02 (1982)
deals with expungement for convicts and allows the Board of Pardons to grant a "pardon
extraordinary." In addition, under MINN. STAT. § 152.18(2)-(3) (1982), convicted narcotics offenders may obtain complete expungement if parole conditions are not violated. Expungement of juvenile records involves distinct policy considerations and is frequently the
subject of special statutory enactments. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260.161(2) (1982). See
generally Gough, supra note 1.
8. 304 N.W.2d at 355.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 356-57. Section 299C. 11 requires that expungement relief be available only
if the criminal proceedings are decided in favor of the arrestee. MINN. STAT. § 2993. 11
LUMBIA
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ordered the sheriff to return all copies of petitioner's fingerprints, photographs, and other identification data." Petitioner's seven other expungement motions were denied. These motions sought to restrain
various state officials and employees from revealing information of petitioner's arrest, 12 trial, and conviction and sought the return, erasure, or
sealing of all government records documenting these occurrences.1 3 The
trial court's denial of these motions was affirmed on appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court.14
Courts have reached various conclusions as to the rights of exonerated
arrestees to have arrest records and other information expunged. These
decisions fall into four groups.' 5 The majority view classifies the problem
as essentially legislative, based on the need for public safety and effective
law enforcement.16 Inconvenience to an individual's privacy is deemed
(1982); see In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803 (Minnn. 1977) (pre-trial dismissal of charges after
successful motion to suppress evidence constitutes valid basis for expungement relief). But
see City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 246 N.W.2d 435, 439 (1976) (stay of
imposition of sentence not deemed determination of proceedings in favor of accused
within meaning of MINN. STAT. § 299C. 11).
11. 304 N.W.2d at 357.
12. Id. The court did not specifically define "arrest record," but found some guidance in the definition of"arrest information" given in MINN. STAT. § 15.162(l)(a) (1980)
(repealed 1981), which stated in relevant part:
"Arrest information" shall include (a) the name, age, and address of the arrested
individual; (b) the nature of the charge against the arrested individual; (c) the
time and place of the arrest; (d) the identity of the arresting agency;
(e) information as to whether an individual has been incarcerated and the place
of incarceration.
Cf. MINN. STAT. § 13.82(2) (1982) ("arrest data" described and classified as public data).
In addition, as was noted in City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 275-76 n.5,
246 N.W.2d 435, 439 n.5 (1976), § 299C. II is directed only to the return of identification
data and not all records relating to arrest.
13. 304 N.W.2d at 355-57.
14. Id. at 357.
15. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972).
16. See, e.g., Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.) (absent express contrary legislative authority, superintendent of police may retain all arrest records in official files of
police department regardless of whether accused has been acquitted or discharged), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132
Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976) (expungement would not be granted where state legislature had
provided an extensive body of legislation controlling this question), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1109 (1977); Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 11. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957) (whether police
can retain their files for identification purposes is matter of public policy); Weisberg v.
Police Dep't of Village of Lynbrook, 46 Misc. 2d 846, 260 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1965) (state courts have no inherent power to order police department records sealed or
otherwise withheld from public knowledge).
In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1977), brought Minnesota in line with the majority of jurisdictions by specifically limiting the power to grant expungement. Without
statutory authorization for expungement, "the court's inherent power is limited to instances where the petitioner's constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by retention
of his records." Id. at 808.
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to be outweighed by the benefit to society in keeping records.' 7 Other
courts deny expungement, but place specific restrictions on the dissemination of arrest record information.18 Restraints on the dissemination of
arrest records are imposed to avoid unjustified invasions of privacy.19 A
third approach permits expungement only in "extreme circumstances,"
such as arrests made upon mistaken identity, police misconduct, or when
no crime has been committed. 20 Finally, some courts have held that expungement may be ordered notwithstanding statutory restrictions or the
absence of narrowly defined circumstances authorizing expungement.
These courts place the burden of proof on the state to show a compelling
2
reason for retention of the arrest records. 1
Arrestees in Minnesota receive limited expungement relief from Minnesota Statutes section 299C. 1.22 Section 299G. 11 requires the return of
all fingerprints, photographs, other identification data, and all copies
thereof upon demand and determination of proceedings in favor of the
arrested individual. 23 In addition, in In re R.L.F,24 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that section 299C. 1 includes arrest records even
though it specifically mentions only fingerprints, photographs, and other
identification data. 25 In re R.L.F also extended the trial court's inherent
expungement power to prevent the serious infringements of constitu17. See,e.g., Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 111. App. 2d 81, 87-88, 142 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1957).
18. The federal courts in the District of Columbia have followed this position since
1967. See, e.g., Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court prohibited dissemination of arrest records to FBI); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (court issued order prohibiting dissemination of arrest record).
19. See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
20. See Case Comment, supra note 6, at 234. This is the position generally taken by
the federal courts. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 966-67 (D.C. Cir.) (mass
arrests where procedures rendered judicial determination of probable cause impossible) ,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Urban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
(mass arrest of individuals without probable cause); United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp.
75, 78 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (federal court has power to grant expungement for individuals
arrested without probable cause or due to harassment).
21. See,e.g., Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972) (court should order
arrest record expunged when harm to individual's right of privacy outweighs public interest in records); Bradford v. Mahan, 219 Kan. 450, 548 P.2d 1223 (1976) (court through its
equitable power may order inaccurate police records expunged when adverse consequences to citizen are shown to outweigh public interest); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App.
334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971) (compelling showing on part of state necessary to justify retention of arrest record after acquittal).
22. MINN. STAT. § 299C. 11 (1982) provides:
Upon the determination of all pending criminal actions or proceedings in favor
of the arrested person, he shall, upon demand, have all such finger and thumb
prints, photographs, and other identification data, and all copies and duplicates
thereof, returned to him, provided it is not established that he has been convicted of any felony, either within or without the state, within the period of ten
years immediately preceding such determination.
23. Id.
24. 256 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1977).
25. Id. at 805.
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tional rights that may result from the retention of records. 26
In CA. the Minnesota Supreme Court established judicial authority to
grant expungement of arrest records in certain circumstances not falling
within the statutory provisions for expungement and not constituting a
substantial infringement of constitutional rights. 27 All courts have "inherent judicial powers" which include the authority to control the performance of "unique judicial functions." 28 Part of the judicial function
"is to control court records and agents of the court in order to reduce or
eliminate unfairness to individuals, even though the unfairness is not of
such intensity as to give a constitutional dimension." 29 Relying on these
concepts, the CA. court held that, when necessary to its unique judicial
function, a trial court can order the expungement of records and materi30
als under the direct control of the court or court personnel.
In CA. the petitioner's motion for the return of fingerprints, photographs, and other identification data was allowed because it was required by statute. 31 The supreme court denied the remaining motions
26. See id. at 808; see also Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
dented, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
27. See 304 N.W.2d at 357. The court held that the trial court had properly ruled
that § 299C. I1 applied only to the idenficiation data and that there was no substantial
constitutional infringement. Id.
28. "Inherent judicial power governs that which is essential to the existence, dignity
and function of a court because it is a court." In re Clerk of Lyon County Court's Compensation, 308 Minn. 172, 176, 241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (1976). The concept of inherent
judicial power grows out of express and implied constitutional provisions mandating a
separation of powers and a strong and independent judiciary. See id. at 176-77, 241
N.W.2d at 784; State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1978). A court's inherent
judicial power is intended to be used to protect itself from encroachment of its constitutional authority by the legislative and executive branches. See In re Clerk of Lyon County
Court's Compensation, 308 Minn. 172, 176-77, 241 N.W.2d 781, 784 (1976); State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1978). A court, however, must avoid encroaching
upon the equally important authority of the legislature and executive. See 304 N.W.2d at
358; see also State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1978) (judicial branch has no
inherent power to impose terms and conditions of sentencing for commission of criminal
act); In re Clerk of Lyon County Court's Compensation, 308 Minn. 172, 176, 241 N.W.2d
781, 784 (1976) (judicial branch has no inherent power to fix clerk's salary); In re Disbarment of Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 55, 248 N.W. 735, 737 (1933) (courts have inherent
power to admit applicants to practice law).
29. 304 N.W.2d at 358.
30. Id. at 360-61.
31. See id at 360. Broader relief for petitioner might have been forthcoming except
for two flaws in his argument. First, an essentially procedural mistake in the form of all
but the first motion made it impossible for the court to order relief. Petitioner failed to
identify with sufficient specificity the documents and individuals sought to be made subject to the order. Id. Records and documents to be expunged or controlled must be described specifically by location, file number, book and page number, or similar
description. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 702 (motions, unless made during hearing or trial, shall
be in writing, state with particularity grounds, and set forth relief or order sought). Second, the record in the case did not support the numerous expungement motions filed. See
304 N.W.2d at 356-57. The inherent power of the court to grant expungement relief ex-
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which sought to prevent disclosure. 3 2 The motions relating to the attorneys and officials within the court's direct control, and thereby subject to
the court's inherent judicial power, were denied for failure to specify the
documents and individuals. 33 Other individuals mentioned in petitioner's motions, such as officials at the Minnesota Security Hospital and
the state correctional facility, were controlled by the executive branch
34
and therefore beyond the inherent power of the courts.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court denied petitioner the complete expungement relief he sought in CA., the opinion indicates an expansion of inherent judicial expungement power in Minnesota. After In
re R.L.F it appeared that the Minnesota court would apply a strict rule,
similar to the "extreme circumstances" jurisdictions. The R.L.F court
had clearly stated that a trial court could order expungement only under
statutory empowerment or "where petitoner's constitutional rights may
be seriously infringed by retention of his records." 3 5 The CA. decision
signals a more liberal approach to the expungement issue. The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently will now enforce expungement orders
relating to court records and court agents if the petitioner's motion is
specific enough to allow efficient administration and expungement is
necessary to protect the petitioner from prejudicial harm.
tends only to documents and agents under the court's control. In CA. petitioner made
motions for the return of documents and to restrain state officials not under the court's
control. Id. at 356-59.
32. 304 N.W.2d at 360-61.
33. Other officials may have been subject to court ordered expungement to a limited
extent. Police departments are part of town or city governments, which are political subdivisions defined by the legislature. See MINN. STAT. §§ 365.15, 415.01 (1982). Correctional facilities and the board of corrections, as well as the Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension, are all part of the executive branch of state government. See id. §§ 15.06,

241.01, 244.08, 299C.01.
34. 304 N.W.2d at 361. It is also important to note that the court seemed much more
inclined to grant the sealing of a file than its expungement, and would allow such a request upon proper showing. Id. at 361; accord District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d
175, 181 (D.C. 1979) (sealing of record achieves protection of individual rights and serves
governmental interests). Sealing of records is preferable to destruction because a sealed
file may be reopened by court order upon a showing of good cause. 304 N.W.2d at 361;see
also District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d 175, 181 (D.C. 1979) (record opened only
upon showing of compelling need). It has been suggested that "good cause" would be
other civil litigation concerning the particular arrest or the discovery of additional evidence. Id.
35. 256 N.W.2d at 808.
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